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Abstract
What is the relationship between degrees of belief and (all-or-nothing) beliefs? Can
the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes?
We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgment-
aggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and
judgment aggregation have been noted before, the literature contains no general
study of the implications of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility re-
sults for belief binarization. We seek to fill this gap. At the centre of this pa-
per is an impossibility theorem showing that, except in simple cases, there exists
no belief-binarization rule satisfying four baseline desiderata (“universal domain”,
“belief consistency and completeness”, “propositionwise independence”, “certainty
preservation”). We show that this result is a corollary of the judgment-aggregation
variant of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and explore several escape routes from it.
1 Introduction
We routinely make belief ascriptions of two kinds. We speak of an agent’s degrees of belief
in some propositions and also of the agent’s beliefs simpliciter. On the standard picture,
degrees of belief (or credences) take the form of subjective probabilities the agent assigns
to the propositions in question, such as when he or she assigns a subjective probability of
1
2 to the proposition that a coin, which has been tossed but not yet observed, has landed
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“heads”. Beliefs take the form of the agent’s overall acceptance of some propositions
and non-acceptance of others, such as when the agent accepts that the sun will rise
tomorrow or that 2 + 2 = 4, while he or she does not accept that there are presently
humans on mars. The agent’s belief set consists of all the propositions that he or she
accepts. What is the relationship between degrees of belief and beliefs? Can the latter
be expressed as a function of the former and, if so, what does this function look like,
formally speaking? Call this the belief-binarization problem.
A widely studied class of belief-binarization rules is the class of threshold rules. Ac-
cording to a threshold rule, an agent believes a proposition (in the all-or-nothing sense)
if and only if he or she has a high-enough degree of belief in it. Threshold rules, however,
run into well-known problems such as lottery paradoxes (e.g., Kyburg 1961). Suppose,
for example, that an agent believes of each lottery ticket among a million tickets that
this ticket will not win, since his or her degree of belief in this proposition is 0.999999
(which, for the sake of argument, counts as “high enough”). The believed propositions
then jointly imply that none of the tickets will win. However, the agent knows that this
proposition is false, and indeed has a degree of belief of 1 in its negation: some ticket will
win. This illustrates that, under a threshold rule, the agent’s belief set may be neither
implication-closed (the agent fails to believe some implications of propositions he or she
believes) nor logically consistent (the agent believes an inconsistent set of propositions).
The belief-binarization problem has recently received renewed attention. For
example, Leitgeb (2014) defends the view that rational belief is formally equivalent
to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief (where this is understood
as a joint constraint on degrees of belief and beliefs, not as a reduction of one side to
the other), and he develops a relevant notion of stability. Lin and Kelly (2012a, 2012b)
use a combination of geometric and logical insights to defend a class of belief-acceptance
rules that avoid lottery paradoxes, and investigate whether and when reasoning with be-
liefs can track reasoning with degrees of belief. In earlier work, Hawthorne and Bovens
(1999) investigate how to make threshold rules consistent, and Douven and Williamson
(2006) prove some triviality results, showing that belief-binarization rules based on what
they call a “structural” criterion for the acceptance of any proposition must require a
threshold of 1 for belief or fail to ensure consistency.
Our aim is to reassess the problem of belief binarization from a di↵erent perspective:
that of judgment-aggregation theory. This is the branch of social choice theory that
investigates how we can aggregate several individuals’ judgments on logically connected
propositions, such as p, q, and p^ q, into corresponding collective judgments.1 A multi-
1For the purposes of this paper, salient contributions include List and Pettit (2002, 2004), Pauly and
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member court, for example, may wish to aggregate its members’ judgments on whether a
defendant did some action (p), whether that action was prohibited by a contract (q), and
whether the defendant is liable for breach of contract (for which p ^ q is necessary and
su cient). Finding methods of aggregation that secure consistent collective judgments
and satisfy some other desiderata is surprisingly di cult. In our example, there might be
a majority for p, a majority for q, and yet a majority against p^q, which illustrates that
majority rule is not generally satisfactory. Majority rule’s failure to secure consistent
and implication-closed collective judgments is reminiscent of a threshold rule’s failure to
secure consistent and implication-closed beliefs in the case of belief binarization. We will
show that this reminiscence is not accidental: several key results in judgment-aggregation
theory have important implications for belief binarization, which are straightforwardly
derivable once the formal apparatus of judgment-aggregation theory is suitably adapted.
Of course, some similarities between lottery paradoxes and the paradoxes of judgment
aggregation have been discussed before (especially by Levi 2004, Douven and Romeijn
2007, and Kelly and Lin 2011). But so far the focus has been on identifying lessons
for judgment aggregation that can be learnt from existing work on the lottery paradox,
not the other way round. The literature contains no general study of the implications
of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility results for belief binarization. We
seek to fill this gap.2
At the centre of this paper is a “baseline” impossibility theorem, which we use to
map out the space of possible solutions to the belief-binarization problem. The theorem
says that, except in limiting cases (which we characterize precisely), there exists no
belief-binarization rule satisfying four desiderata:
(i) universal domain: the rule should always work;
(ii) consistency and completeness of beliefs: beliefs should be logically consistent
van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006, 2007), Dietrich and List (2007a, b, 2013), Nehring and Puppe (2010),
and Dokow and Holzman (2010a, b). For a survey, see List (2012). Judgment-aggregation theory was
inspired by earlier work on the “doctrinal paradox” in law and economics (Kornhauser and Sager 1986).
Social choice theory in its traditional form, which goes back to Nicolas de Condorcet in the 18th century
and Kenneth Arrow in the 20th, does not address the aggregation of judgments on logically connected
propositions, but focuses on the aggregation of preferences over two or more options (e.g., rankings
of electoral candidates or policy proposals). It has recently been shown, however, that several classic
social-choice-theoretic results can be generalized from preference aggregation to judgment aggregation.
2Douven and Romeijn (2007, p. 318) conclude their paper with an invitation to conduct the kind of
study we embark on here: “given the liveliness of the debate on judgement aggregation, and the many
new results that keep coming out of that, it is not unrealistic to expect that at least some theorems
originally derived, or still to be derived, within that context can be applied fruitfully to the context of
the lottery paradox, and will teach us something new, and hopefully also important, about this paradox.”
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and complete, as explained in more detail later;
(iii) propositionwise independence: the belief in any proposition should depend
only on the degree of belief in it; and
(iv) certainty preservation: in the special case in which the degrees of belief
are already “binary”, taking only the values 0 or 1, these beliefs should be
preserved as the all-or-nothing beliefs.
To find a possible belief-binarization rule, we must relax at least one of these desider-
ata. Notably, this result is a corollary of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s
classic impossibility theorem (in the form proved in Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and
Holzman 2010a, and Nehring and Puppe 2010). Arrow’s theorem, which was originally
proved in preference-aggregation theory (1951/1963), demonstrates the non-existence of
any non-dictatorial methods of aggregation satisfying some plausible desiderata. Our
analysis shows that the Arrovian impossibility carries over to belief binarization and, in
consequence, that the lottery paradox and the paradoxes of social choice can be traced
back to a common source.
The present paper does not compete with, but rather complements, existing work on
the relationship between degree of belief and belief. Our aim is not to defend a particular
solution to the belief-binarization problem, but to map out the space of possible solutions
in a novel way. Although some of our findings no doubt replicate – or provide alternative
derivations of – earlier insights, our approach o↵ers a new perspective on the relevant
logical space, and, to the best of our knowledge, our central impossibility theorem, in
its full generality, is new. Furthermore, we believe that there is value in linking two
di↵erent areas of study: judgment aggregation and belief binarization.
One important qualification is due. We here explore the belief-binarization problem
as a formal problem. When we ask whether an agent’s all-or-nothing beliefs can be
expressed as a function of his or her degrees of belief, we use the term “function” in the
mathematical sense: a function is simply a special kind of relation and should not be
interpreted in any metaphysically loaded way. Nonetheless, our investigation is relevant
to a number of metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological questions. We may
be interested, for example, in whether an agent really has both degrees of belief and
all-or-nothing beliefs, or whether one of the two modes of ascription – say, that of all-
or-nothing beliefs – is just a simplified shorthand for the other – say, a summary of the
agent’s degrees of belief. Furthermore, even if an agent has both kinds of belief, we may
be interested in whether one kind – say all-or-nothing belief – is reducible to the other
– say degree-of-belief – or whether no such reduction is possible. And even if neither
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kind of belief can be reduced to the other, we may still be interested in whether there
is some systematic connection between the two (say, a connection of supervenience),
or whether they are, in principle, quite independent from one another. Finally, we
may be interested in how rational beliefs relate to rational degrees of belief, even if, in
the absence of rationality, the two could come apart. A formal analysis of the belief-
binarization problem is relevant to all of these questions. It can tell us what formal
constraints the relationship between degrees of belief and beliefs could, or could not,
satisfy, thereby constraining the substantive philosophical views one can consistently
hold on this matter.
2 The parallels between belief binarization and judgment
aggregation
To give a first flavour of the parallels between belief binarization and judgment aggrega-
tion, we begin with a simple example of a judgment-aggregation problem, which echoes
our earlier example of the multi-member court. Suppose a committee of three experts
has to make collective judgments on the propositions p, q, r, p^q^r, and their negations
on the basis of the committee members’ individual judgments. The individual judgments
are as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: A judgment-aggregation problem
p q r p ^ q ^ r ¬(p ^ q ^ r)
Individual 1 True True False False True
Individual 2 True False True False True
Individual 3 False True True False True
Proportion of support 23
2
3
2
3 0 1
The di culty lies in the fact that there are majorities (in fact, two-thirds majorities)
in support of each of p, q, and r, but the conjunction of these propositions, p ^ q ^ r,
is unanimously rejected and its negation, ¬(p ^ q ^ r), unanimously accepted. Majority
voting, or any supermajority rule under which a quota of 23 is su cient for the collec-
tive acceptance of any proposition, yields a set of collective judgments that is neither
implication-closed (it fails to include p ^ q ^ r despite the inclusion of p, q, and r) nor
consistent (it includes all of p, q, r, and ¬(p^q^r)). Pettit (2001) has called problems of
this sort discursive dilemmas, though they are perhaps best described simply as majority
inconsistencies. A central goal of the theory of judgment aggregation is to find aggrega-
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tion rules that generate consistent and/or implication-closed collective judgments while
also satisfying some other desiderata (List and Pettit 2002).
A belief-binarization problem can take a similar form. Suppose an agent seeks to
convert his or her degrees of belief in the propositions p, q, r, p^q^r, and their negations
into all-or-nothing beliefs. Suppose, specifically, the agent assigns an equal subjective
probability of 13 to each of three distinct possible worlds, in which p, q, and r have
di↵erent truth-values, as shown in Table 2. Each world renders two of p, q, and r true
and the other false. The bottom row of the table shows the agent’s overall degrees of
belief in the propositions.
Table 2: A belief-binarization problem
p q r p ^ q ^ r ¬(p ^ q ^ r)
World 1 (subj. prob. 13) True True False False True
World 2 (subj. prob. 13) True False True False True
World 3 (subj. prob. 13) False True True False True
Degree of belief 23
2
3
2
3 0 1
Here the di culty lies in the fact that while the agent has a relatively high degree of
belief (namely 23) in each of p, q, and r, his or her degree of belief in the conjunction of
these propositions is 0, and the agent’s degree of belief in its negation is 1. Any threshold
rule under which a degree of belief of 23 su ces for full belief in any proposition (and, a
fortiori, any rule with a lower threshold) yields a belief set that is neither implication-
closed nor consistent. On the other hand, if we demand a higher threshold for including
a proposition in the agent’s belief set, that belief set will include only ¬(p ^ q ^ r) and
will therefore be incomplete with respect to many proposition-negation pairs (accepting
neither p, nor ¬p, for example). Other examples can be constructed in which more
demanding threshold rules also lead to inconsistencies.
If we identify individual voters in Table 1 with possible worlds in Table 2, the paral-
lels between our two problems should be evident. In this simple analogy, possible worlds
in a belief-binarization problem play the role of individuals in a judgment-aggregation
problem, and the agent’s degree of belief in any proposition plays the role of the propor-
tion of individuals accepting that proposition. In fact, the function that assigns to each
proposition in a judgment-aggregation problem the proportion of individuals support-
ing it behaves formally like a probability function over these propositions: it satisfies
the constraints of probabilistic coherence (assuming individual judgment sets are consis-
tent and complete), though it is interpretationally very di↵erent. This already suggests
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that belief-binarization and judgment-aggregation problems are structurally similar (for
earlier discussions of this similarity, see Levi 2004 and Douven and Romeijn 2007).
Yet, there is an important di↵erence in format. In a judgment-aggregation prob-
lem, we are usually given the entire profile of individual judgments, i.e., the full list
of the individuals’ judgment sets, as in the first three rows of Table 1. In a belief-
binarization-problem, by contrast, we are only given an agent’s degrees of belief in the
relevant propositions, i.e., the last row of Table 2, summarizing his or her overall sub-
jective probabilities. The possible worlds underpinning these probabilities are hidden
from view. Thus the input to a belief-binarization problem corresponds, not to a fully
specified profile of individual judgment sets, but to a propositionwise anonymous profile,
i.e., a specification of the proportions of individuals supporting the various propositions
under consideration. This gives us, not a full table such as Table 1, but only its last
row.3 Indeed, in our subsequent formal analysis, possible worlds drop out of the picture.
In sum, a belief-binarization problem corresponds to a propositionwise anonymous
judgment-aggregation problem, the problem of how to aggregate the final row of a table
such as Table 1 into a single judgment set. We can view this as an aggregation problem
with a special restriction: namely that when we determine the collective judgments, we
must pay attention only to the proportions of individuals supporting each proposition
and must disregard, for example, who holds which judgment set. A belief-binarization
problem will then have a solution of a certain kind if and only if the corresponding
propositionwise anonymous judgment-aggregation problem has a matching solution.
Of course, the theory of judgment aggregation has primarily focused, not on the
aggregation of propositionwise anonymous profiles (final rows of the relevant tables), but
on the aggregation of fully specified profiles (lists of judgment sets across all individuals,
without the special restriction we have mentioned). We will see, however, that despite the
more restrictive informational basis of belief binarization several results from judgment-
3There is another notion of an anonymous profile, with which the notion of a propositionwise anony-
mous profile should not be confused. While a propositionwise anonymous profile specifies the proportion
of individuals supporting each proposition, an anonymous profile simpliciter specifies the proportion
of individuals supporting each combination of judgments across the relevant propositions. The fully
specified profile in Table 1, for instance, gives rise to an anonymous profile in which the judgment sets
{p,q,¬r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)}, {p,¬q,r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)}, and {¬p,q,r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)} each receive the support of 13 of
the individuals, which, in turn, gives rise to a propositionwise anonymous profile in which p, q, and r
each receive the support of 23 of the individuals, p ^ q ^ r receives the support of none of them, and
¬(p^ q^ r) receives the support of all of them. Propositionwise anonymous profiles correspond to equiv-
alence classes of anonymous profiles, which, in turn, correspond to equivalence classes of fully specified
profiles. Degree-of-belief functions are structurally equivalent to propositionwise anonymous profiles.
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aggregation theory carry over.4 We will now make this precise.
3 Belief binarization formalized
We begin with a formalization of the belief-binarization problem. Let X be the set of
propositions on which beliefs are held (where propositions are subsets of some underlying
set of worlds).5 We call X the proposition set. For the moment, our only assumption
about the proposition set is that it is non-empty and closed under negation (i.e., for
any proposition p in X, its negation ¬p is also in X). In principle, the proposition set
could be an entire algebra of propositions, i.e., a set of propositions that is closed under
negation and conjunction (and thereby also under disjunction).
A degree-of-belief function is a function Cr that assigns to each proposition p in X
a number Cr(p) in the interval from 0 to 1, where this assignment is probabilistically
coherent.6 A belief set is a subset B ✓ X. It is called consistent if B is a consistent set;
it is called complete (relative to X) if it contains a member of each proposition-negation
pair p,¬p in X; and it is called implication-closed (relative to X) if it contains every
proposition p in X that is entailed by B. Consistency and completeness jointly imply
implication-closure.
A belief-binarization rule for X is a function f that maps each degree-of-belief func-
tion Cr on X (within some domain of admissible degree-of-belief functions) to a belief
set B = f(Cr). An important class of binarization rules is the class of threshold rules.
4Douven and Romeijn (2007) and Kelly and Lin (2011) proceed the other way round and derive some
impossibility results for anonymous judgment aggregation from analogous results on belief binarization.
These results di↵er from the canonical “Arrovian” impossibility result on judgment aggregation, on which
we focus here (Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010a, and Nehring and Puppe 2010). The
latter cannot be derived from any results on belief binarization because of the richer informational basis of
judgment aggregation. As noted, belief-binarization problems correspond to propositionwise anonymous
judgment-aggregation problems, not to judgment-aggregation problems simpliciter.
5The following background definitions apply. Let ⌦ be some non-empty set of possible worlds. A
proposition is a subset p ✓ ⌦. For any proposition p, we write ¬p to denote the complement (negation)
of p, i.e., ⌦\p. For any two propositions p and q, we write p^ q to denote the intersection (conjunction)
of p and q, i.e., p \ q; and we write p _ q to denote their union (disjunction), i.e., p [ q. A set S of
propositions is (logically) consistent if its intersection is non-empty, i.e.,
T
p2S
p 6= Ø; S (logically) entails
another proposition q if the intersection of all propositions in S is a subset of q, i.e.,
T
p2S
p ✓ q. A
proposition p is tautological if p = ⌦ and contradictory if p = Ø.
6Formally, Cr is a function from X into [0, 1] which is extendable to a probability function (with
standard properties) on the algebra generated by X. The algebra generated by X is the smallest algebra
including X.
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Here there exists some threshold t in [0, 1], which can be either strict or weak, such that,
for every admissible degree-of-belief function Cr, the belief set B is the following:
B = {p 2 X : Cr(p) exceeds t},
where “Cr(p) exceeds t” means
Cr(p) > t in the case of a strict threshold
and Cr(p)   t in the case of a weak threshold.
More generally, we can relativize thresholds (and their designations as strict or weak)
to the propositions in question. To do this, we must replace t in the expressions above
with tp, the proposition-specific threshold for proposition p, where each proposition-
specific threshold can again be deemed to be either strict or weak. If the acceptance
threshold (or its designation as strict or weak) di↵ers across di↵erent propositions, we
speak of a non-uniform threshold rule, to distinguish it from the uniform rules with an
identical specification of the threshold for all propositions. Threshold rules are by no
means the only possible belief-binarization rules; later, we consider other examples.
We now introduce four desiderata that we might, at least initially, expect a belief-
binarization rule to meet. The first desideratum says that the belief-binarization rule
should always work, no matter which degree-of-belief function is fed into it as input.
Universal domain. The domain of f is the set of all degree-of-belief functions on X.
The second desideratum says that the belief set generated by the belief-binarization
rule should always be consistent and complete (relative to X). While consistency is a
plausible requirement on the belief setB (though we later consider its relaxation too), one
may object that completeness is too demanding, since it rules out suspending belief on
some proposition-negation pairs. Indeed, it would be implausible to defend completeness
as a general requirement of rationality. However, for the purpose of characterizing the
logical space of possible belief-binarization rules, it is a useful starting point. Remember
that completeness is required only relative to X, the proposition set under consideration.
We relax the completeness requirement in our subsequent discussion.
Belief consistency and completeness. For every Cr in the domain of f , the belief
set B = f(Cr) is consistent and complete.
The third desideratum is another useful baseline requirement. It says that the belief
in any proposition p should depend only on the degree of belief in p, not on the degree
of belief in other propositions.
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Propositionwise independence. For any Cr and Cr0 in the domain of f and any p
in X, if Cr(p) = Cr0(p) then p 2 B , p 2 B0, where B = f(Cr) and B0 = f(Cr0).
The final desideratum is quite minimal. It says that, in the special case in which the
degree-of-belief function is already binary (i.e., it only ever assigns degrees of belief 0
or 1 to the propositions in X), the resulting all-or-nothing beliefs should be exactly as
specified by that degree-of-belief function.
Certainty preservation (“no change if beliefs are already binary”). For any
Cr in the domain of f , if Cr already assigns extremal degrees of belief (0 or 1) to all
propositions in X, then, for every proposition p in X, B contains p if Cr(p) = 1 and B
does not contain p if Cr(p) = 0, where B = f(Cr).
It is easy to see that, at least in simple cases, these desiderata can be met by a
suitable threshold rule. For example, if the proposition set X contains only a single
proposition p and its negation ¬p (or many logically independent proposition-negation
pairs), the four desiderata are met by any threshold rule that uses a (strict) threshold t
for p and a (weak) threshold 1  t for ¬p, where 0  t < 1. As we will see below, things
become more di cult once the proposition set X is more complex.
4 Judgment aggregation formalized
We now move on to the formal definition of a judgment-aggregation problem (following
the logic-based model developed in List and Pettit 2002 and Dietrich 2007). The propo-
sition set X remains as defined in the last section and is now interpreted as the set of
propositions on which judgments are to be made. In judgment-aggregation theory, this
set is also called the agenda. Let there be a finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of individuals
(with n   2). Each individual i holds a judgment set, labelled Ji, which is defined just
like a belief set in the previous section (the name “judgment set” is purely conventional).
So Ji is a subset of X, which is called consistent, complete, and implication-closed if it
has the respective properties, as defined above. As before, consistency and completeness
jointly imply implication-closure. A combination of judgment sets across the n individ-
uals, (J1, ..., Jn), is called a profile. An example of a profile is given by the first three
rows of Table 1 above. Here, the underlying set X consists of p, q, r, p^ q ^ r, and their
negations.
A judgment-aggregation rule forX is a function F that maps each profile of individual
judgment sets (within some domain of admissible profiles) to a collective judgment set
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J . Like the individual judgment sets, the collective judgment set J is a subset of X.
The best-known example of a judgment-aggregation rule is majority rule: here, for each
profile (J1, ..., Jn), the collective judgment set is the set of majority-accepted propositions
in X, formally
J = {p 2 X : |{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}| > n
2
}.
As we have seen, an important deficiency of majority rule is that, when the propo-
sitions in X are logically connected in certain ways, the majority judgment set may be
inconsistent, as already illustrated in Table 1.
We now state some desiderata that are often imposed on a judgment-aggregation
rule. They are generalizations of the desiderata that Arrow (1951/1963) imposed on a
preference-aggregation rule – more on this later. The first desideratum says that the
judgment-aggregation rule should accept as input any profile of consistent and complete
individual judgment sets.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the set of all profiles of consistent and complete
individual judgment sets on X.
The second desideratum says that the collective judgment set produced by the ag-
gregation rule should always be consistent and complete, where completeness is again
required only relative to X. In many (though not all) judgment-aggregation problems,
the completeness requirement is reasonable insofar as propositions are included in the
proposition set X (the “agenda”) precisely because they are supposed to be adjudicated.
We also consider relaxations of this requirement below.
Collective consistency and completeness. For every profile (J1, ..., Jn) in the do-
main of F , the collective judgment set J = F (J1, ..., Jn) is consistent and complete.
The third desideratum says that the collective judgment on any proposition p should
depend only on the individual judgments on p, not on the individual judgments on other
propositions.
Propositionwise independence. For any profiles (J1, ..., Jn) and (J 01, ..., J 0n) in the
domain of F and any p in X, if p 2 Ji , p 2 J 0i for every individual i in N , then
p 2 J , p 2 J 0, where J = F (J1, ..., Jn) and J 0 = F (J 01, ..., J 0n).
The final desideratum says that if all individuals hold the same individual judgment
set, this judgment set should become the collective judgment set.
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Consensus preservation. For any unanimous profile (J, ..., J) in the domain of F ,
F (J, ..., J) = J .
As in our discussion of the baseline desiderata on a belief-binarization rule, it is
important to note that, at least in simple cases, the present desiderata can be met
by a familiar judgment-aggregation rule such as majority rule. For example, if the
proposition set X contains only a single proposition p and its negation ¬p (or many
logically independent proposition-negation pairs), then majority rule satisfies all four
desiderata. The same is true for a suitable super- or sub-majority rule.
5 The correspondence between belief binarization and
judgment aggregation
We are now in a position to describe the relationship between belief binarization and
judgment aggregation more precisely. Let f be a belief-binarization rule for the proposi-
tion set X. For any group size n, we can use f to construct a corresponding judgment-
aggregation rule F for X. The construction is in two steps.
In the first step, we convert any given profile of consistent and complete individual
judgment sets into the corresponding propositionwise anonymous profile, i.e., the speci-
fication of the proportion of individual support for each proposition in X. Formally, for
each profile (J1, ..., Jn), let Cr(J1,...,Jn) be the function (from X into [0, 1]) that assigns
to each proposition p in X the proportion of individuals accepting it:
Cr(J1,...,Jn)(p) =
|{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}|
n
.
Although the function Cr(J1,...,Jn) is a “proportion-of-support” function on X, it behaves
formally like a degree-of-belief function and can thus be mathematically treated as such
a function. In particular, it is probabilistically coherent, since each individual judgment
set in (J1, ..., Jn) is consistent and complete.
In the second step, we apply the given belief-binarization rule f to the constructed
proportion function Cr(J1,...,Jn) so as to yield an all-or-nothing belief set, which can then
be reinterpreted as a collective judgment set. As long as Cr(J1,...,Jn) is in the domain
of f, the judgment set J = f(Cr(J1,...,Jn)) is well-defined, so that (J1, ..., Jn) is in the
domain of the judgment-aggregation rule that we are constructing.
These two steps yield the judgment-aggregation rule F which assigns to each admis-
sible profile (J1, ..., Jn) the collective judgment set
F (J1, ..., Jn) = f(Cr(J1,...,Jn)).
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Call this the judgment-aggregation rule induced by the given belief-binarization rule. In
essence, it aggregates judgments by binarizing the proportion function induced by any
given profile of individual judgment sets.
Proposition 1. The judgment-aggregation rule F induced by a belief-binarization rule
f is anonymous, where anonymity is defined as follows.
Anonymity. F is invariant under permutations (relabellings) of the individuals. For-
mally, for any profiles (J1, ..., Jn) and (J 01, ..., J 0n) in the domain of F which are permu-
tations of one another, F (J1, ..., Jn) = F (J 01, ..., J 0n).
Proposition 1 is a consequence of the fact that the proportion of individuals ac-
cepting each proposition is not a↵ected by permutations of those individuals. Formally,
we have Cr(J1,...,Jn) = Cr(J 01,...,J 0n) whenever the profiles (J1, ..., Jn) and (J
0
1, ..., J
0
n) are
permutations of one another. Furthermore, the following result holds:
Proposition 2. If the belief-binarization rule f satisfies universal domain, belief consis-
tency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation, then,
for any group size n, the induced judgment-aggregation rule F satisfies universal domain,
collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and unanimity
preservation.
To show this, suppose the binarization rule f satisfies all four desiderata, and let F
be the induced aggregation rule for a given group size n. Then:
• F satisfies universal domain because, for every profile (J1, ..., Jn) of consistent and
complete individual judgment sets, the function Cr(J1,...,Jn) is in the domain of f ,
and so F (J1, ..., Jn) = f(Cr(J1,...,Jn)) is well-defined.
• F satisfies collective consistency and completeness because, for every profile
(J1, ..., Jn) in its domain, f(Cr(J1,...,Jn)) is consistent and complete.
• F satisfies propositionwise independence because, for any profiles (J1, ..., Jn) and
(J 01, ..., J 0n) in its domain, if p 2 Ji , p 2 J 0i for every individual i in N , then
Cr(J1,...,Jn)(p) = Cr(J 01,...,J 0n)(p), and so p 2 J , p 2 J 0, where J = f(Cr(J1,...,Jn))
and J 0 = f(Cr(J 01,...,J 0n)) (by propositionwise independence of f).
• F satisfies consensus preservation because, for any unanimous profile (J, ..., J) in
its domain, Cr(J,...,J) assigns extremal degrees of belief (0 or 1) to all propositions
in X (namely 1 if p 2 J and 0 if p /2 J), and so we must have f(Cr(J,...,J)) = J (by
certainty preservation of f).
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In sum, the existence of a belief-binarization rule satisfying our four baseline desiderata
guarantees (for every group size n) the existence of an anonymous jugment-aggregation
rule satisfying the four corresponding aggregation-theoretic desiderata. In the next sec-
tion, we discuss the consequences of this fact.
6 An impossibility theorem
As noted above, when the proposition setX is su ciently “simple”, such asX = {p,¬p},
we can indeed find belief-binarization rules for X that satisfy our four desiderata. Sim-
ilarly, for such a set X, we can find judgment-aggregation rules satisfying the corre-
sponding aggregation-theoretic desiderata. We now show that this situation changes
dramatically when X is more complex. In this section, we state and prove the simplest
version of our impossiblity result. We present some more general versions in subsequent
sections. To state our first result, let us call a proposition p contingent if it is neither
tautological, nor contradictory.
Theorem 1. For any proposition set X that is closed under conjunction or disjunction
and contains more than one contingent proposition-negation pair (i.e., any non-trivial
algebra), there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying universal domain, belief con-
sistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation.
To prove this result, let X be a proposition set with the specified properties. Sup-
pose, contrary to Theorem 1, there exists a belief-binarization rule for X satisfying all
four desiderata. Call it f . Consider the judgment-aggregation rule F induced by f via
the construction described in the last section, for some group size n   2. By Proposition
1, F satisfies anonymity. Further, by Proposition 2, since f satisfies the four baseline
desiderata on belief binarization, F satisfies the corresponding four aggregation-theoretic
desiderata. However, the following result is well known to hold, as explained and refer-
enced in detail in the next section:
Background Result 1. For any proposition set X that is closed under conjunc-
tion or disjunction and contains more than one contingent proposition-negation pair,
any judgment-aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective consistency and
completeness, propositionwise independence, and consensus preservation is dictatorial,
i.e., there exists some antecedently fixed individual i in N such that, for each profile
(J1, ..., Jn) in the domain, F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji.
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So, there could not possibly exist an anonymous (and thereby non-dictatorial) ag-
gregation rule satisfying all four conditions, and hence the belief-binarization rule f on
which the aggregation rule F was based could not satisfy our four desiderata on belief
binarization, contrary to our supposition. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Since subjective probability functions are normally defined on sets of propositions
that are algebras, Theorem 1 immediately implies that our four baseline desiderata are
mutually inconsistent when we seek to binarize a degree-of-belief function that con-
stitutes a full-blown subjective probability function. However, we are able to prove
something more general, even for cases in which the proposition set X is not an algebra
of propositions.
7 The judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem
and its corollary for belief binarization
Background Result 1, from which we have derived Theorem 1, is a special case of a
more general theorem. It establishes the non-existence of non-dictatorial judgment-
aggregation rules satisfying the four desiderata not only for proposition sets that are
algebras, but more generally. By implication, as we will see, our impossibility result on
belief binarization holds more generally too.
The significance of the more general background result on judgment aggregation lies
in the fact that it has Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem as an immediate corollary, as
explained in the next section: it can thus be viewed as the judgment-aggregation variant
of Arrow’s theorem. For the general theorem to apply, the proposition set X must have
two combinatorial properties, which are jointly weaker than the previous requirement
that X be a non-trivial algebra:7
Path-connectedness. For any two contingent propositions p, q in X, there exists a
path of conditional entailments from p to q (as explicated in a footnote).8
Pair-negatability. There exists a subset Y of X which is minimally inconsistent (i.e,
7The first property was first introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2010) in a di↵erent formalism under
the name “total blockedness”. The second was introduced, in di↵erent variants, by Dietrich (2007),
Dietrich and List (2007a), and Dokow and Holzman (2010a) (the latter introduced an algebraic variant
under the name “non-a neness”).
8Formally, a proposition p conditionally entails a proposition q if there exists some subset Y of X,
consistent with each of p and ¬q, such that {p} [ Y entails q. A path of conditional entailments from p
to q is a sequence of propositions p1, p2, ..., pk in X with p1 = p and pk = q such that p1 conditionally
entails p2, p2 conditionally entails p3, ..., and pk 1 conditionally entails.
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Y is inconsistent but all its proper subsets are consistent) and contains two distinct
propositions p and q such that replacing each of p and q with their negations renders Y
consistent.9
A simple example of a proposition set X that is both path-connected and pair-
negatable is the set consisting of p, q, p ^ q, p _ q, and their negations.10 Another
example is a set X consisting of binary ranking propositions of the form “x is preferable
to y”, “y is preferable to z”, “x is preferable to z”, and so on, where x, y, z, ... are three
or more options (e.g., electoral alternatives, candidates, states of a↵airs), as explained in
more detail in the next section. A third example is a set X which constitutes an algebra
with more than one contingent proposition-negation pair.
The judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem can now be stated as follows:
Background Result 2. For any proposition set X that is path-connected and pair-
negatable, any judgment-aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective consis-
tency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and consensus preservation is
dictatorial (Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010a, building on Nehring
and Puppe 2010).11
Put di↵erently, when X is path-connected and pair-negatable, there exists no non-
dictatorial aggregation rule satisfying the four desiderata. Given our discussion up to
this point, it should be clear that this result has a direct corollary for belief binarization,
which can be derived in exact analogy to Theorem 1 in the previous section. The
non-existence of any non-dictatorial judgment-aggregation rule for X satisfying the four
desiderata immediately implies the non-existence of any anonymous such rule, and since
any belief-binarization rule forX satisfying our four binarization desiderata would induce
such an aggregation rule, there cannot exist a belief-binarization rule of this kind. In
sum, the following theorem holds:
9Formally, Y \{p, q} [ {¬p,¬q} is consistent.
10To establish path-connectedness, note that, from any one of these propositions, we can find a path
of conditional entailments to any other (e.g., we can find a path from p to q via p _ q: p entails p _ q,
conditional on the empty set; and p_ q entails q, conditional on ¬p). To establish pair-negatability, note
that the minimally inconsistent set Y = {p, q,¬(p ^ q)} becomes consistent if we replace p and q with
their negations ¬p and ¬q.
11This theorem was proved independently, and in di↵erent formal frameworks, by Dietrich and List
(2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a). The latter proved, in addition, that (if X is finite) the two
combinatorial properties of X are not merely su cient, but also necessary for the theorem’s conclusion
to hold. Both of the cited papers build on earlier work by Nehring and Puppe, reported in Nehring
and Puppe (2010). Nehring and Puppe’s version of the theorem imposes an additional monotonicity
desideratum on the aggregation rule, but does not require the pair-negatability property of X.
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Theorem 2. For any proposition set X that is path-connected and pair-negatable,
there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying universal domain, belief consistency
and completeness, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation.
In the Appendix, we present a further refinement of this result, in particular a log-
ically tight characterization of the minimal conditions on the proposition set X under
which the theorem’s negative conclusion – the non-existence of any belief-binarization
rule satisfying the four desiderata – holds. (Theorem 2 itself gives only a su cient
condition on X for that conclusion to hold, not a necessary condition.)
8 The relationship with Arrow’s original theorem
To illustrate that Background Result 2 is indeed a generalization of Arrow’s original
impossibility theorem – and hence that our impossibility theorem on belief-binarization
and Arrow’s theorem can be traced back to a common source – it is useful to revisit
Arrow’s original result (1951/1963).12
As we have already noted, Arrow considered the aggregation of preferences, rather
than judgments. Suppose there is a finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of individuals (with
n   2), each of whom holds a preference ordering, Pi, over some set K = {x, y, ...} of
options. A combination of preference orderings across the n individuals, (P1, ..., Pn),
is called a profile of preference orderings. We are looking for a preference-aggregation
rule, F , which is a function that maps each profile of individual preference orderings
(within some domain of admissible profiles) to a collective preference ordering P . Arrow
imposed four conditions on a preference-aggregation rule.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the set of all profiles of rational individual
preference orderings. (We here call a preference ordering rational if it is a transitive,
irreflexive, and complete binary relation onK; for expositional simplicity, we thus restrict
our attention to indi↵erence-free preferences.)
Collective rationality. For every profile (P1, ..., Pn) in the domain of F , the collective
preference ordering R = F(P1, ..., Pn) is rational.
Pairwise independence. For any profiles (P1, ..., Pn) and (P 01, ..., P 0n) in the domain
of F and any pair of options x and y in K, if Pi and P 0i rank x and y in the same way
for every individual i in N , then P and P 0 also rank x and y in the same way, where
R = F(P1, ..., Pn) and R0 = F(P 01, ..., P 0n).
12We here follow the analysis in Dietrich and List (2007a). For a precursor, see List and Pettit (2004).
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The Pareto principle. For any profile (P1, ..., Pn) in the domain of F and any pair
of options x and y in K, if Pi ranks x above y for every individual i in N , then P also
ranks x above y, where R = F(P1, ..., Pn).
Arrow’s original theorem (1951/1963) can be stated as follows:
Arrow’s theorem. For any set K of three or more options, any preference-aggregation
rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, pairwise independence, and the
Pareto principle is dictatorial, i.e., there exists some antecedently fixed individual i in
N such that, for each profile (P1, ..., Pn) in the domain, F(P1, ..., Pn) = Pi.
To confirm that Background Result 2 from the previous section is indeed a gener-
alization of Arrow’s theorem, we note that the latter can be derived from the former.
The key observation is that, setting aside interpretational di↵erences, we can represent
any preference-aggregation problem formally as a special kind of judgment-aggregation
problem. To construct this representation, we define the set X of propositions on which
judgments are made as the set of pairwise ranking propositions of the form xPy (“x is
preferable to y”), where x and y are options in K and P represents pairwise preference.
Formally,
X = {xPy : x, y 2 K with x 6= y}.
Call this proposition set the preference agenda for K. Under the simplifying assump-
tion of irreflexive preferences, we can interpret yPx as the negation of xPy, and so
the constructed proposition set is negation-closed. We call any subset Y of X consis-
tent if Y is a consistent set of binary ranking propositions relative to the rationality
constraints on preferences introduced above (transitivity etc.).13 For example, the set
Y = {xPy, yPz, xPz} is consistent in this sense, while the set Y = {xPy, yPz, zPx} is
not, because it involves a breach of transitivity.
Since any preference ordering P over K is just a binary relation, it can be uniquely
represented by a subset of X, namely the subset consisting of all pairwise ranking propo-
sitions validated by P .14 In this way, rational preference orderings over K stand in a
one-to-one correspondence with consistent and complete judgment sets for the prefer-
ence agendaX. Furthermore, preference-aggregation rules (for preferences overK) stand
in a one-to-one correspondence with judgment-aggregation rules (for judgments on the
associated preference agenda X).
13Technically, the set Y is consistent if and only if there exists at least one rational (here: transitive,
irreflexive, and complete) preference ordering over K that validates all the binary ranking propositions
contained in Y .
14As defined here, this representation assumes strict preferences.
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Now, applied to X, the judgment-aggregation desiderata of universal domain, col-
lective consistency and completeness, and propositionwise independence collapse into
Arrow’s original desiderata of universal domain, collective rationality, and pairwise inde-
pendence. Consensus preservation collapses into a weaker counterpart of Arrow’s Pareto
principle, which says that whenever all individuals hold the same preference ordering
over all options, this preference ordering should become the collective one.15
It can be verified that when K contains more than two options, the corresponding
preference agenda X is path-connected and pair-negatable, and so Background Result 2
applies, yielding Arrow’s original theorem as a corollary.
Corollary of Background Result 2. For any preference agenda X defined for a set
K of three or more options, any judgment-aggregation rule satisfying universal domain,
collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and consensus
preservation is dictatorial.
Figure 1 displays the logical relationships between (i) the jugdment-aggregation vari-
ant of Arrow’s theorem, (ii) Arrow’s original theorem, and (iii) our baseline impossibility
theorem on belief binarization. In short, Arrow’s theorem and our result on belief bi-
narization, which are at first sight very di↵erent from one another, can both be derived
from the same common impossibility theorem on judgment aggregation.
Figure 1: The common source of two distinct impossibility results
9 Escape routes from the impossibility
If we wish to avoid the impossibility of belief binarization, we must relax at least one of
the four baseline desiderata we have introduced. In what follows, we discuss a number
15This weaker desideratum is implied by Arrow’s Pareto principle (in the presence of collective ra-
tionality), but does not generally imply it. The converse implication holds in the presence of universal
domain and pairwise independence.
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of possible escape routes from our impossibility result, roughly presented in an order
of how obvious they seem (though that order is largely a matter of taste and nothing
hinges on it).16
9.1 Relaxing completeness of beliefs, but retaining implication-closure
The first and perhaps most obvious response to our impossibility result is to argue that
the requirement of completeness of all-or-nothing beliefs is too strong. This suggests
dropping that requirement, while retaining the familiar requirement that all-or-nothing
beliefs should be consistent as well as closed under logical implication (within the propo-
sition set X).
Belief consistency and implication-closure. For every Cr in the domain of f , the
belief set B = f(Cr) is consistent and implication-closed (relative to X).
This permits suspending belief on some proposition-negation pairs inX. Indeed, even
an empty belief set satisfies consistency and implication-closure (assuming X contains
no tautology). Surprisingly, however, the new desideratum does not get us very far
if we insist on the other three desiderata. The new set of desiderata permits only a
single, extremely conservative binarization rule, namely a uniform threshold rule with
threshold 1 for all propositions. This can be viewed as a triviality result, along the lines
of – though in some respects more general than – other triviality results in the literature
(e.g., Douven and Williamson 2006).17
Theorem 3. For any proposition set X that is path-connected and pair-negatable, any
belief-binarization rule satisfying universal domain, belief consistency and implication-
closure, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation is a threshold rule
with a uniform threshold of 1 for the acceptance of any proposition, i.e., for any degree-
of-belief function Cr in the domain, f(Cr) = {p 2 X : Cr(p) = 1}.
This result, too, is a consequence of a result on judgment aggregation, though the
proof is a bit more complicated than our earlier proofs. Let the proposition set X be
path-connected and pair-negatable, and suppose f is a belief-binarization rule satisfy-
ing the desiderata listed in Theorem 3. As before, for any group size n, f induces an
16For simplicity, we assume that the proposition set X is finite in Sections 9.2 to 9.5.
17Unlike Douven and Williamson’s result, our result does not require the set of propositions under
consideration to be an algebra, and it does not presuppose that the su cient condition for belief ac-
ceptance is what Douven and Williamson call “structural”; rather, our desideratum of propositionwise
independence allows, in principle, the use of di↵erent acceptance criteria for di↵erent propositions.
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anonymous judgment-aggregation rule F . By the analogue of Proposition 2, F sat-
isfies universal domain, collective consistency and implication-closure, propositionwise
independence, and consensus preservation. But the following result holds:
Background Result 3. For any proposition set X that is path-connected and pair-
negatable, any judgment-aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective consis-
tency and implication-closure, propositionwise independence, and consensus preservation
is oligarchic: i.e., there exists some antecedently fixed non-empty set M of individu-
als in N such that, for each profile (J1, ..., Jn) in the domain, F (J1, ..., Jn) =
\
i2M
Ji
(Dietrich and List 2008, Dokow and Holzman 2010b).
Consistently with this result, the set M of “oligarchs” could be any non-empty subset of
N , ranging from a singleton set, where M = {i} for some individual i, to the set of all
individuals, where M = N . In the first case, the aggregation rule is dictatorial; in the
last, it is the unanimity rule. Since any aggregation rule induced by a belief-binarization
rule is anonymous, and an anonymous aggregation rule can be oligarchic only if it is
the unanimity rule, Background Result 3 immediately implies that the induced rule F
is the unanimity rule. So, no proposition is collectively accepted under F with less than
100% support.
Could the belief-binarization rule f on which F is based di↵er from a threshold rule
with threshold 1? In what follows, we show that if f were distinct from such a rule, this
would contradict what we have just learnt from Background Result 3. Less technically
inclined readers may skip the rest of this proof and move on to Section 9.2.
To complete the proof, suppose that f is not a threshold rule with threshold 1. There
must then exist a proposition q in X and a degree-of-belief function Cr with Cr(q) < 1
such that q 2 B, where B = f(Cr).18 In the Appendix, we show that, under the present
conditions, f must be monotonic: if q 2 f(Cr), then q 2 f(Cr0) for any other credence
function Cr0 with Cr0(q) > Cr(q).
Now consider what this implies for any induced aggregation rule F . Pick two con-
sistent and complete judgment sets J, J 0 ✓ X such that q 2 J and q /2 J 0, and con-
struct a profile (J1, ..., Jn) for some su ciently large group size n such that a propor-
tion of more than Cr(q) of the individuals in N , but fewer than all, have the judg-
ment set J and the rest have the judgment set J 0. By the construction of F , we have
F (J1, ..., Jn) = f(Cr(J1,...,Jn)), where for each proposition p in X,
18The proposition q must be contingent. If q were tautological, we could not have Cr(q) < 1, and if
it were contradictory, we could not have q 2 B (given consistency of B).
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Cr(J1,...,Jn)(p) =
|{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}|
n
.
Since Cr(J1,...,Jn)(q) > Cr(q) and our binarization rule f is monotonic, we must have
q 2 f(Cr(J1,...,Jn)) and hence q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn), despite the lack of unanimous support
for q. This contradicts the fact that F is the unanimity rule. We conclude that f is a
threshold rule with a uniform threshold of 1 for the acceptance of any proposition.
9.2 Relaxing implication-closure of beliefs
A second escape route from our impossibility result is to relax the requirements on all-
or-nothing beliefs further and to require only their consistency, while no longer requiring
implication-closure (compare also Kyburg 1961).
Belief consistency. For every Cr in the domain of f , the belief set B = f(Cr) is
consistent.
This opens up a number of non-trivial possibilities, even in the presence of the other
desiderata. In particular, the following result holds (a version of which has also been
proved by Easwaran and Fitelson forthcoming):
Theorem 4. Let k be the size of the largest minimally inconsistent subset of the
proposition setX. Any threshold rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or higher
19) for each
proposition satisfies universal domain, belief consistency, propositionwise independence,
and certainty preservation.
It is worth explaining the significance of k, the size of the largest minimally incon-
sistent subset of X. This parameter can be interpreted as a simple measure of the
interconnectedness between propositions in X. If X contains only one or several uncon-
nected proposition-negation pairs, then the largest minimally inconsistent subsets of X
are of the form {p,¬p}, so k is 2.20 If X contains p, q, p^q, and their negations, then the
largest minimally inconsistent subset is {p, q,¬(p ^ q)}, so k is 3. If X contains p, q, r,
p^ q ^ r, and their negations, as in our example in Section 2, then the largest minimally
inconsistent subset is {p, q, r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)}, so k is 4. In consequence, the binarization
19The highest admissible threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1 (under which the acceptance
criterion for any proposition is a degree of belief of 1).
20This assumes that some proposition p in X is contingent. If X contains no contingent propositions,
then the largest minimally inconsistent subset of X is the singleton set consisting of the contradiction.
22
threshold k 1k required in Theorem 5 increases with the complexity of these cases, from
1
2 to
2
3 to
3
4 .
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To prove Theorem 4, let f be a threshold rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or higher)
for each proposition. It is easy to see that f satisfies universal domain, propositionwise
independence, and certainty preservation.22 Suppose, for a contradiction, that B =
f(Cr) is inconsistent for some degree-of-belief function Cr in the domain. Then B must
have at least one minimally inconsistent subset Y , whose size, in turn, is at most k. For
every proposition p in Y to be accepted by f , we must have Cr(p) > k 1k . Since Cr is
probabilistically coherent, it is extendable to a well-defined probability function Pr on
the algebra generated by X. This algebra contains the conjunction of all propositions
in Y . Since Y is an inconsistent set, this conjunction is a contradiction and must be
assigned probability 0 by Pr. But we now show that this is contradicted by the fact that
Pr(p) > k 1k for every p in Y , which has to hold because Pr is an extension of Cr and
so Pr(p) = Cr(p) for every p in X. First note that the probability of the conjunction
of any two propositions – no matter how negatively correlated – must exceed 0 when
each proposition has a probability greater than 12 . Similarly, the probability of the
conjunction of any three propositions must exceed 0 when each has a probability greater
than 23 . Generally, the probability of the conjunction of any k propositions that each
have a probability greater than k 1k must exceed 0, a contradiction. This completes the
proof.
Again, this result has a counterpart in judgment-aggregation theory. A qualified
majority rule is a judgment-aggregation rule which assigns, to each profile (J1, ..., Jn),
the collective judgment set
J = {p 2 X : |{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}| exceeds qn},
where “exceeds” can be read either strictly (as “>”) or weakly (as “ ”), and q is some
acceptance threshold between 12 and 1. It is a supermajority rule when the acceptance
threshold requires more than a simple majority of the individuals (“50%+1”). The
following result holds:
Background Result 4. Let k be the size of the largest minimally inconsistent sub-
set of the proposition set X. Any qualified majority rule with a strict threshold of
21Formulas similar to k 1k have been used by Bovens and Hawthorne (1999), though without explicitly
invoking the notion of minimally inconsistent sets of propositions.
22The latter excludes a strict threshold of 1 for any non-contradictory proposition, but permits a weak
threshold of 1.
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k 1
k (or higher
23) for each proposition satisfies universal domain, collective consistency,
propositionwise independence, and unanimity preservation (Dietrich and List 2007b).
It should be evident that the qualified majority rule in Background Result 4 is simply
the judgment-aggregation rule induced by the binarization rule in Theorem 4.
9.3 Relaxing propositionwise independence
Another escape route from our impossibility result involves giving up the requirement
that the all-or-nothing belief in any proposition p inX depend only on the degree of belief
in p and “going holistic”, by allowing the all-or-nothing belief in p to depend also on the
degrees of belief in other propositions in X. If we go along this route, several binarization
rules become possible. Again, they all have counterparts in judgment-aggregation theory.
We here give only a few examples.
Premise-based rules. Under a premise-based rule, we first designate some subset Y
of the proposition set X as a set of “premises” (where Y is closed under negation).
We then (i) form the all-or-nothing beliefs on these premises by means of a suitable
propositionwise independent binarization rule (such as a threshold rule), restricted to
the premises, and (ii) derive the all-or-nothing beliefs on all other propositions by logical
inference. Formally, for every degree-of-belief function Cr in the domain, we have
f(Cr) = {p 2 X : g(Cr) \ Y entails p},
where Y is the set of premises and g is the binarization rule applied to them (e.g., a
threshold rule). As long as the set Y and the rule g are chosen so as to guarantee a
consistent set g(Cr) \ Y (e.g., by making sure that the premises in Y are logically in-
dependent from one another), the premise-based rule will always yield consistent and
implication-closed belief sets. Premise-based rules have been extensively discussed in
judgment-aggregation theory, building on an earlier work in law and economics (e.g.,
Kornhauser and Sager 1986 and Kornhauser 1992, Pettit 2001, List and Pettit 2002,
Chapman 2002, Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006, List 2006, Dietrich 2006; for more re-
cent generalizations, see Dietrich and Mongin 2010). Here, a group makes its collective
judgments by taking majority votes only on some logically independent premises (e.g.,
“Did the defendant do a particular action?”, “Was he or she contractually obliged not
to do that action?”) and deriving its judgments on all relevant conclusions by logical
23The highest admissible threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1 (under which the acceptance
criterion for any proposition is unanimous support).
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interference (e.g., “Is the defendant liable for breach of contract?”). The downside of
a premise-based rule in judgment aggregation is that a proposition can end up being
collectively accepted by logical inference even if none of the individuals accepts that
proposition. Similarly, in belief binarization, a proposition could end up being included
in the all-or-nothing belief set despite the assignment of a very low, or even zero, de-
gree of belief to it. Furthermore, the output of a premise-based rule depends crucially
on what the specified set of premises is. Premise-based belief binarization, like premise-
based judgment aggregation, is plausible only to the extent that we have a non-arbitrary
way of identifying the premises and are prepared to generate all our overall beliefs (or
judgments) on the basis of considering these premises alone.
Sequential priority rules. Sequential priority rules are generalizations of premise-
based rules. To define a sequential priority rule, we specify some order of priority
among the propositions in X (formally a linear order over the elements of X). For each
degree-of-belief function Cr, we then determine the belief set B = f(Cr) as follows.
The propositions in X are considered in the given order of priority, and the belief set
B is built up sequentially. For each proposition under consideration, say p, we begin by
asking whether p is entailed by propositions that we have included in B in earlier steps.
If the answer is yes, we embrace this entailment and include p in B. If the answer is
no, we determine whether or not to include p in B by applying some propositionwise
binarization criterion to Cr(p), for example some threshold. By construction, the re-
sulting belief set is always consistent. Whether it is also implication-closed depends on
the propositionwise binarization criterion and the order of priority. The downside of a
sequential priority rule, like that of a premise-based rule, is that it sometimes mandates
the inclusion of a proposition in the belief set B even when the agent’s degree of belief
in it is very low or perhaps zero (namely when that proposition is entailed by other
accepted propositions). Sequential priority rules for belief binarization are analogous to
sequential priority rules for judgment aggregation (List 2004, Dietrich and List 2007b).
The only di↵erence lies in the use of a propositionwise binarization criterion (such as
a propositionwise threshold) instead of a propositionwise aggregation criterion (such as
propositionwise majority voting). In both belief binarization and judgment aggregation,
sequential priority rules may be path-dependent : the output they generate is not gener-
ally invariant under changes of the order of priority among the propositions. This means
that the defensibility of such a rule depends, in part, on our ability to specify that order
non-arbitrarily.
Distance-based rules. We have already encountered two classes of judgment-
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aggregation rules violating propositionwise independence that have direct analogues for
belief binarization: premise-based rules and sequential priority rules. A third class is
the class of distance-based rules. In judgment-aggregation theory, such a rule is defined
as follows. We first introduce some distance metric over judgment sets, which specifies
how “distant” any two judgment sets are from one another (formally, a distance metric
assigns to each pair of judgment sets a non-negative number, interpreted as the distance
between them). For each profile of individual judgment sets, we then select a collective
judgment set that minimizes the sum of the distances from the individual judgment sets,
according to that distance metric. Some distance-based aggregation rules require more
information than what is contained in a propositionwise anonymous profile, and hence
have no counterpart in the case of belief binarization, but others naturally carry over
to belief binarization. The best-known distance-based aggregation rule is the Hamming
rule (e.g., Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez 2002, Pigozzi 2006). Here the distance between
any two judgment sets is given by the number of propositions in X on which the two
judgment sets disagree (which means the proposition in question is contained in one set
but not in the other). For each profile of individual judgment sets (J1, ..., Jn), we se-
lect a consistent and complete (or perhaps consistent and implication-closed) collective
judgment set J which minimizesX
i2N
|{p 2 X : p 2 J 6, p 2 Ji}|.
Such a judgment set need not be unique; so we must either define the Hamming rule
as a multi-function (under which more than one collective judgment set can be assigned
to any given profile of individual judgment sets), or introduce a tie-breaking rule. The
details need not concern us here. Note that minimizing the total Hamming distance is
equivalent to minimizing X
p2X
|{i 2 N : p 2 J 6, p 2 Ji}|.
This, in turn, is equivalent to minimizingX
p2X
|J(p)  Cr(J1,...,Jn)(p)|,
where, for each p in X,
J(p) =
(
1 if p 2 J
0 if p /2 J
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and Cr(J1,...,Jn) is the function that assigns to each proposition p in X the proportion
of individuals accepting p within the given profile (J1, ..., Jn), as defined earlier. This
suggests the following definition of a Hamming rule for belief binarization: for each
degree-of-belief function Cr, let f(Cr) be a consistent and complete (or alternatively,
consistent and implication-closed) belief set B which minimizesX
p2X
|B(p)  Cr(p)|,
where B(p) is defined in exact analogy to J(p). Informally speaking, the Hamming
rule binarizes any given degree-of-belief function by selecting an all-or-nothing belief
set that is “minimally distant” from it, subject to the constraints of consistency and
completeness (or alternatively, consistency and implication-closure). Like its judgment-
aggregation counterpart, the Hamming rule for belief binarization must be defined as a
multi-function, since there may be more than one distance-minimizing belief set, or we
require some tie-breaking rule.
Other non-independent binarization rules. It is worth noting that the relationship
between anonymous judgment-aggregation rules and belief-binarization rules can be used
not only to derive binarization rules from aggregation rules but also to derive aggregation
rules from binarization rules that have been proposed in the literature. In this way,
some insights from belief-binarization theory carry over to judgment-aggregation theory
(recall Levi 2004). Given space constraints, we here discuss only one class of rules
for which this reverse translation is possible: Leitgeb’s P-stability-based rules. Leitgeb
(2014) o↵ers a method of constructing, for each degree-of-belief function Cr (defined on
some algebra of propositions), a specific acceptance threshold such that the set of all
propositions for which the agent’s degree of belief exceeds the threshold is consistent
and implication-closed. Crucially, the threshold may di↵er for di↵erent degree-of-belief
functions. The key idea is to identify a so-called P-stable proposition; this is a proposition
p for which Cr(p|q) exceeds 12 for any proposition q consistent with p. The agent then
accepts all those propositions in which he or she has a degree of belief greater than or
equal to t = Cr(p), where p is the identified P-stable proposition. If we assign to each
degree-of-belief function the belief set generated through this process, we obtain a well-
defined belief-binarization rule. Since the acceptance threshold may di↵er for di↵erent
degree-of-belief functions, the present binarization rule does not satisfy propositionwise
independence. Leitgeb recognizes this when he acknowledges that the cost of his proposal
is “a strong form of sensitivity of belief to context” (p. 168), and he gives some arguments
in defence of this context sensitivity. Using the construction discussed earlier in this
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paper, we can use this belief-binarization rule to define a corresponding anonymous
judgment-aggregation rule. To the best of our knowledge, this aggregation rule has
not previously been investigated in the literature on judgment aggregation. It inherits
its potential interest-value from the arguments that Leitgeb has o↵ered in support of
the underlying belief-binarization rule. A similar translation is possible for Lin and
Kelly’s camera-shutter rules for belief binarization (2012a, 2012b). These, too, are non-
independent rules that could be used to generate corresponding judgment-aggregation
rules (see also Kelly and Lin 2011).
9.4 Relaxing universal domain
A fourth escape route from our impossibility result opens up once we relax the desider-
atum of universal domain. Recall that universal domain requires the belief-binarization
rule to work for every well-defined degree-of-belief function. If, instead, we suitably
restrict the domain of admissible degree-of-belief functions, it becomes easier to find a
belief-binarization rule satisfying the other desiderata.
Suppose, for example, that a degree-of-belief function Cr is deemed admissible only
if it has the property that, for every minimally inconsistent subset Y of X, there is at
least one proposition in p in Y with Cr(p)  12 . It then follows that even a permissive
binarization rule such as “more-likely-than-not binarization” (a threshold rule with a
strict threshold of 12 for all propositions) will never generate an inconsistent belief set B.
If B were inconsistent for some Cr in the restricted domain, then B would have to have
at least one minimally inconsistent subset Y , which, in turn, would have to contain at
least one proposition p for which Cr(p)  12 (because Cr is in the restricted domain).
But then p could not be accepted under a threshold rule with a strict threshold of 12 .
More generally, if every admissible credence function Cr has the property that, for every
minimally inconsistent subset Y of X, there is at least one proposition p in Y with
Cr(p)  t, then any threshold rule with a strict threshold of t or higher will never run
into any inconsistencies.
When translated into restrictions on admissible profiles of judgment sets in judgment-
aggregation theory, the domain restrictions just mentioned match exactly the domain
restrictions required for the consistency of majority rule and supermajority rule with
threshold t, respectively. In judgment-aggregation theory, domain restrictions are of-
ten associated with situations in which the groups of individuals whose judgments are
aggregated are reasonably “cohesive”: disagreements betweeen them are limited.
In belief-binarization theory, it is harder to justify the required domain restrictions
in a non-ad-hoc way. Nonetheless, it remains a possibility to argue that successful belief
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binarization is feasible if the agent’s degree-of-belief function falls into a su ciently
“well-behaved” domain.
9.5 Relaxing consistency of beliefs
A more revisionist response to our impossiblity result is to argue that all-or-nothing
beliefs need not be consistent. Of course, if outright inconsistency of beliefs is permitted,
the problems we have identified go away immediately. But since inconsistent beliefs go
against standard requirements of rationality, the present response may not seem very
promising. However, there is a notion of less-than-fully-consistent belief which captures
the idea that some inconsistencies are less “blatant” than others, so that we might opt
for a belief-binarization rule that avoids “blatant” inconsistencies, while not securing full
consistency (indeed, typical human beings are unlikely to hold fully consistent beliefs).
To introduce the relevant notion of less-than-full consistency (drawing on List 2014),
we begin with a few intuitive observations. If someone believes a proposition that is self-
contradictory, such as p ^ ¬p, he or she seems rather blatantly inconsistent. If someone
believes two propositions, neither of which is self-contradictory, but which are jointly
inconsistent, such as p and ¬p, he or she is still fairly inconsistent, but less so than in
the previous case. If someone believes three jointly inconsistent propositions, any two
of which are mutually consistent, such as p, p ! q, and ¬q, his or her belief set is
still relatively inconsistent, but not as much as in the two previous cases. If someone’s
belief set contains ten jointly inconsistent propositions, any nine of which are mutually
consistent, this is nowhere near as bad as the previous inconsistencies. Now the key
idea is to interpret the size of the smallest inconsistent set of believed propositions as a
measure of the agent’s inconsistency.
Formally, let us say that a belief set B is k-inconsistent if it has an inconsistent
subset of size less than or equal to k. In our examples, a belief set that includes the
proposition p^¬p is 1-inconsistent; a belief set that includes the propositions p and ¬p is
2-inconsistent, and so on. Similarly, we say that a belief set B is k-consistent if it is free
from any inconsistent subsets of size up to k. As the value of k increases, k-consistency
becomes more demanding, and any residual inconsistencies become less “blatant”. Full
consistency is the limiting case of k-consistency as k goes to infinity. Suppose we replace
the requirement of belief consistency with the following:
Belief k-consistency (for some fixed value of k). For every Cr in the domain of f ,
the belief set B = f(Cr) is k-consistent.
We then obtain a possibility result:
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Theorem 5. Any threshold rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or higher
24) for each
proposition satisfies universal domain, belief k-consistency, propositionwise indepen-
dence, and certainty preservation.
The proof of this theorem, which we omit for brevity, is very similar to that of
Theorem 4 above. The key point is that a probabilistically coherent function Cr could
never assign a degree of belief greater than k 1k to each of k or fewer mutually inconsistent
propositions; the implied subjective probability of their conjunction would then have to
be greater than 0, which would violate probabilistic coherence. Like our other results,
Theorem 5 has an analogue in judgment-aggregation theory.
Background Result 5. Any qualified majority rule with a strict threshold of k 1k
(or higher25) for each proposition satisfies universal domain, collective k-consistency,
propositionwise independence, and unanimity preservation (List 2014).
In sum, agents who are prepared to settle for less-than-full consistency in their beliefs
can safely use threshold rules with a su ciently high threshold.
9.6 Relaxing certainty preservation
A final logically possible escape route from our impossibility result is to relax certainty
preservation. However, this escape route is of little interest. First, certainty preservation
is a very plausible requirement and thus hard to relax. It only says that, in the special
case in which the agent’s degrees of belief are already “binary” (meaning the agent assigns
credence 0 or 1 to all propositions in X), these binary beliefs should be preserved as the
all-or-nothing beliefs.
Second, even if we were prepared to give up certainty preservation, this would not
get us very far. For a large class of proposition sets X, we would still be faced with
an impossibility result. To state this result, call a proposition p an atom of X if p is
non-contradictory and, for every proposition q in X, p entails q or p entails ¬q. Further,
call the proposition set X atomic if it contains an exhaustive set of atoms.26 It is easy to
see that any proposition set X that forms an algebra (if finite) is atomic. The following
result holds:
24As before, the highest admissible threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1 (under which
the acceptance criterion for any proposition is a degree of belief of 1).
25As before, the highest admissible threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1 (under which
the acceptance criterion for any proposition is unanimous support).
26Formally, X is atomic if the set {¬p 2 X : p is an atom of X} is inconsistent.
30
Theorem 6. For any proposition set X that is atomic and contains more than one
contingent proposition-negation pair, any belief-binarization rule satisfying universal
domain, belief consistency and completeness, and propositionwise independence is con-
stant, i.e., it delivers as its output the same antecedently fixed belief set B, no matter
which degree-of-belief function Cr is fed into it as input.
Of course, such a binarization rule is totally useless. According to it, the agent’s all-or-
nothing beliefs are completely unresponsive to his or her degrees of belief. Like our earlier
results, Theorem 6 is a corollary of an analogous theorem on judgment aggregation.
Background Result 6. For any proposition set X that is atomic and contains more
than one contingent proposition-negation pair, any judgment-aggregation rule satisfy-
ing universal domain, collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise indepen-
dence, and consensus preservation is either dictatorial or constant (Dietrich 2006; for a
related result, see Pauly and van Hees 2006).
It is fair to conclude, then, that the relaxation of certainty preservation o↵ers no
compelling escape route from our impossibility result.
10 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the relationship between degrees of belief and all-or-nothing beliefs
from a formal perspective, drawing on insights from the theory of judgment aggregation.
We have proved a baseline impossibility theorem, which turns out to be a cousin of
Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem on preference aggregation. The two results are each
corollaries of a single, mathematically more general impossibility theorem on judgment
aggregation.
The central message of our analysis is that the possibilities of expressing all-or-
nothing beliefs as a function of degrees of belief are rather limited. Any such possibility
requires the relaxation of at least one of four baseline desiderata, and typically this
relaxation comes at a cost. If we relax universal domain, we must use a binarization rule
that does not work for all possible degree-of-belief functions. If we relax belief consistency
and completeness, then, depending on whether or not we retain the requirement of
implication-closure, we must either use an extremely conservative acceptance criterion
for every proposition – namely a degree-of-belief threshold of 1 – or live with violations
of implication-closure or consistency. If we relax propositionwise independence, we must
accept what Leitgeb (2014, p. 168) has described as “a strong form of sensitivity of
31
belief to context”, where an agent’s belief in one proposition may be a↵ected by changes
in his or her degrees of belief in others. If we relax certainty preservation, we face
another impossibility result: for a large class of proposition sets, the only binarization
rules satisfying the other three desiderata are constant rules, under which the agent’s
beliefs are not responsive at all to his or her degrees of belief.
If one is reluctant to embrace any of these possibilities, one may be led to conclude
that there is no simple formal relationship to be found between degrees of belief and
all-or-nothing beliefs. The most radical version of this conclusion would be the denial
that agents genuinely have both kinds of belief. Extreme Bayesians, for instance, might
hold that agents have no all-or-nothing beliefs. On that view, beliefs always come in
degrees. The opposite view would be that degrees of belief are theoretical constructs
of probability theory and that, in reality, agents have only all-or-nothing beliefs. On
this picture, degrees enter at most in the content of a belief. An agent might have a
full belief in the proposition that the epistemic probability of another proposition is x.
Crucially, his or her attitude towards the “outer” proposition would then be an all-or-
nothing attitude, which does not come in degrees. It would just so happen that that
proposition asserts a probability assignment to another proposition (the “inner” one).
A less radical conclusion would be that agents have degrees-of-belief as well as all-
or-nothing beliefs, but that the two kinds of belief may come apart: they may be two
distinct aspects of an agent’s credal state, none of which is determined by the other. To
defend that picture, one would have to say more about what such a multi-faceted credal
state would look like – a topic well beyond the scope of this paper (for a recent relevant
discussion, see Easwaran and Fitelson forthcoming). We need not take a stand here on
what the correct conclusion is. Our aim has simply been to lay out some salient options,
and to o↵er an analysis of the logical space in which they are located, in the hope that
this exercise will inspire further exploration.
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Appendix
Minimal conditions for the impossibility result on belief binarization
In the case of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem, it is known that
the two combinatorial properties on the proposition set X, path-connectedness and pair-
negatability, are not only su cient, but also necessary for the theorem’s negative con-
clusion, as long as X is finite (Dokow and Holzman 2010a, building on Nehring and
Puppe 2010). In other words, as soon as the set X is either not path-connected or not
pair-negatable, there exist non-dictatorial judgment-aggregation rules satisfying the four
desiderata; we no longer face an impossibility.
Interestingly, the same combinatorial properties, while su cient for our impossibility
result on belief binarization, are not necessary for it. We can derive the impossibility
even under weaker assumptions about the proposition set X. This is because, as we
have seen, belief binarization corresponds to a particularly restrictive case of judgment
aggregation: the case of propositionwise anonymous aggregation. In the presence of this
special restriction, judgment aggregation also runs into an impossibility more easily.
Consider the following combinatorial property, which is weaker than
path-connectedness (Nehring and Puppe 2010).
Blockedness. There is at least one proposition p in X such that there exists a path
of conditional entailments from p to ¬p and also a path of conditional entailments from
¬p to p. (Paths of conditional entailments are defined exactly as in the definition of
path-connectedness.)
For example, the set consisting of p, q, p $ q, and their negations is blocked (with
$ understood as a material biconditional), while the set consisting of p, q, p ^ q, and
their negations is not.27 The following background result holds:
27To show that the first set is blocked, it su ces to observe that there exist paths of conditional
entailments from p to ¬p and back. To see the former, note that {p}[{p$ q} entails q, and {q}[{¬(p$
q)} entails ¬p. To see the latter, note that {¬p}[{p $ q} entails ¬q, and {¬q} [ {¬(p $ q)} entails
p. To show that the second set is not blocked, it su ces to observe that there is no path of conditional
entailments from ¬p to p, from ¬q to q, or from ¬(p ^ q) to p ^ q.
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Background Result 7. There exist judgment-aggregation rules satisfying universal
domain, collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, consen-
sus preservation, and anonymity for all group sizes n if and only if the proposition set
X is not blocked (Dietrich and List 2013, building on Nehring and Puppe 2010).28
We now use this result to the derive the following:
Theorem 7. For any proposition setX that is blocked, there exists no belief-binarization
rule satisfying universal domain, belief consistency and completeness, propositionwise in-
dependence, and certainty preservation. Conversely, for any finite proposition set X that
is not blocked, there exists such a belief-binarization rule.
Before we prove this result, it is worth commenting on its significance. The present
theorem establishes exact minimal conditions on X for the impossibility of belief bina-
rization to hold. To illustrate, even for a proposition set as simple as the one consisting
of p, q, p $ q, and their negations, there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying
our four baseline desiderata (because the proposition set is blocked). By contrast, for
the proposition set consisting of p, q, p ^ q, and their negations, there exists such a
rule (because the set is not blocked), although, as we explain below, the rule is fairly
“degenerate”. It would accept any proposition among p, q, and p ^ q if and only if the
agent assigns degree of belief 1 to it, and would accept its negation otherwise.
To prove Theorem 7, let us first assume that the proposition set X is blocked, and
suppose, contrary to Theorem 7, there exists a belief-binarization rule for X satisfying
all four desiderata. Call it f . We have seen that, for any group size n, f induces an
anonymous judgment-aggregation rule F , via the construction described in Section 5,
and this aggregation rule satisfies all four aggregation-theoretic desiderata. However,
the existence of such a judgment-aggregation rule contradicts Background Result 7. So,
there cannot exist a belief-binarization rule of the specified kind. This completes the
negative part of the proof.29
Conversely, let us assume that the proposition set X is finite and not blocked. The
following result holds:
Background Lemma 1. If the proposition set X is finite and not blocked, there exists
at least one consistent and complete subset B⇤ ✓ X which has at most one proposition
in common with every minimally inconsistent subset Y ✓ X (Nehring and Puppe 2010).
28If “if” claim assumes that the proposition set X is finite.
29Alternatively, some of the additional formal results in the second part of the Appendix could be
used to give a direct proof of this negative result.
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To illustrate, recall that the set X consisting of p, q, p ^ q, and their negations
is not blocked. And indeed, we can find a subset B⇤ ✓ X which has at most one
proposition in common with every minimally inconsistent subset Y ✓ X. Simply take
B⇤ = {¬p,¬q,¬(p ^ q)}. The minimally inconsistent subsets of X are firstly all the
proposition-negation pairs, with whichB⇤ obviously has only one proposition in common,
secondly the sets {¬p, p^q} and {¬q, p^q}, with which B⇤ again has only one proposition
in common, and finally Y = {p, q,¬(p ^ q)}, with which B⇤ also has only proposition in
common.
To establish the existence of a belief-binarization rule satisfying all four desiderata,
we construct one such rule. Define f as follows. For every degree-of-belief function Cr
on X, let f(Cr) = B, where
B = {p 2 X : Cr(p) = 1 or [p 2 B⇤ and Cr(p) 6= 0]} ,
where B⇤ is as specified in Background Lemma 1. To give an intuitive flavour of this
binarization rule, let us interpret B⇤ as a “default belief set”. The present binarization
rule then “accepts” a proposition p if and only if the agent assigns degree of belief 1 to
that proposition or the proposition belongs to the default set and the agent does not
assign degree of belief 0 to it. (This is in fact a special kind of non-uniform threshold
rule, with a strict threshold of 0 for all propositions in B⇤ and a weak threshold of 1 for
all other propositions.) Why does this binarization rule satisfy the four desiderata? Let
us begin with the desiderata that are easy to check:
• f satisfies universal domain because it is well-defined for every degree-of-belief
function on X.
• f satisfies propositionwise independence because, under its definition, the all-or-
nothing belief in any proposition p (i.e., whether or not p is in B) depends only
on the degree of belief in p (i.e., Cr(p)), not on the degree of belief in other
propositions.
• f satisfies certainty preservation because, for any degree-of-belief function Cr that
assigns extremal degrees of belief (0 or 1) to all propositions in X, the definition
of f ensures that B contains all propositions p in X for which Cr(p) = 1 and does
not contain any for which Cr(p) = 0.
• f satisfies belief completeness because, for every degree-of-belief function Cr and
every proposition-negation pair p, ¬p in X, one of the two propositions always
satisfies the criterion for membership in B = f(Cr).
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Finally, to see that f satisfies belief consistency, suppose, for a contradiction, that B =
f(Cr) is inconsistent for some degree-of-belief function Cr on X. Then B, being a
finite inconsistent set of propositions, has at least one minimally inconsistent subset Y .
By Background Lemma 1, at most one proposition in Y occurs in B⇤. Consider first
the case in which there is no such proposition. For all propositions q in Y , it then
follows immediately that Cr(q) = 1; otherwise those propositions could not have met
the membership criterion for B (of which Y is a subset). But since Cr is probabilistically
coherent, the fact that Cr(q) = 1 for all q in Y contradicts the inconsistency of Y . So let
us turn to the alternative case in which exactly one proposition in Y occurs in B⇤. Call it
p. For all propositions q in Y distinct from p, it follows again that Cr(q) = 1; otherwise
those propositions could not have met the membership criterion for B (of which Y is a
subset). But since Y is inconsistent and Cr is probabilistically coherent, the fact that
Cr(q) = 1 for all q in Y distinct from p implies that Cr(p) = 0, and so p cannot meet
the membership criterion for B, a contradiction. This completes our proof that f does
indeed satisfy the four desiderata on belief binarization.
To emphasize, we do not claim that f is a substantively interesting binarization rule.
The point of its construction is merely to show that, as soon as the set X violates the
combinatorial property of blockedness, the impossibility result of Theorem 7 no longer
goes through.
Some additional formal results
In this final section, we prove some additional formal results to give some further insights
into the consequences of our desiderata on the belief-belief-binarization rule f . We have
already used one of these insights (about the monotonicity of f) as a lemma in one of our
earlier proofs (in Section 9.1). Moreover, the present results allow us to establish some
facts about belief binarization “directly”, i.e., not as corollaries of background results
on judgment aggregation.
Let f be a belief-binarization rule satisfying propositionwise independence. This
implies that, for every proposition p in X, the question of whether or not p is included
in the belief set B depends only on the degree of belief in p. For each proposition p, let
Cp be the set of those credence values in [0, 1] for which p is accepted into B, i.e.,
Cp = {x 2 [0, 1] : p 2 f(Cr) for some admissible Cr with Cr(p) = x}.
Call the elements of Cp the acceptance credences for p. We can then represent f in terms
of the family (Cp)p2X of sets of acceptance credences:
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for any admissible Cr, f(Cr) = {p 2 X : Cr(p) 2 Cp}.
Claim 1. If f satisfies, in addition, universal domain and certainty preservation,
then, for every proposition p in X (where p 6= Ø), we must have 1 2 Cp.
To see this, simply consider any {0,1}-valued degree-of-belief function Cr such that
Cr(p) = 1. Since p 6= Ø, a well-defined (i.e., probabilistically coherent) such degree-of-
belief function exists, and since f satisfies universal domain, Cr is in the domain of f .
Certainty preservation then implies that p must be contained in B = f(Cr), and hence
1 2 Cp.
Claim 2. If f satisfies, in addition, implication-closure, then, for any two proposi-
tions p, q in X, if p conditionally entails q, then every acceptance credence for p is also
an acceptance credence for q, and thus Cp ✓ Cq.
To show this, suppose p conditionally entails q, and x is an acceptance credence for
p. Because of this conditional entailment, there exists a subset Y ✓ X, consistent with
each of p and ¬q, such that {p} [ Y entails q. It is easy to see that {p, q} [ Y and
{¬p,¬q}[Y are each consistent sets. For this reason, there exist well-defined degree-of-
belief functions Cr0 and Cr00 such that Cr0 assigns credence 1 to all the propositions in
the first set, and Cr00 assigns credence 1 to all the propositions in the second set. Since
any linear average of well-defined degree-of-belief functions is probabilistically coherent,
the degree-of-belief function Cr = xCr0 + (1   x)Cr00 is well-defined. Let B = f(Cr).
Note the following. First, we have p 2 B, because Cr(p) = x, and x is an acceptance
credence for p. Second, we have Y ✓ B, because Cr(r) = 1 for every r 2 Y , and 1 is an
acceptance credence for every proposition (by Claim 1). Finally, since {p}[ Y ✓ B and
{p}[ Y entails q, we must have q 2 B, because B is implication-closed. But Cr(q) = x;
so x is an acceptance credence for q too.
Claim 3. If f is as in Claim 2, then for any two propositions p, q in X that are
connectable, in both directions, by a sequence of pairwise conditional entailments, we
have Cp = Cq.
This follows immediately from Claim 2. Note further that, if all propositions con-
nectable, in both directions, by a sequence of pairwise conditional entailments, then the
binarization rule f is representable by a single set C ✓ [0, 1] of acceptance credences,
which are applied to every proposition in X.
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Claim 4. If f is representable by a single C and X is pair-negatable, then f is
monotonic, meaning that, for any x, y in [0,1] with y > x, if x is in C, then y is also
in C. This implies that f is a threshold rule with t = inf(C). The threshold is weak if
inf(C) 2 C and strict otherwise.
To prove this, consider some x in C, and consider any y > x. Suppose X is pair-
negatable. Then X has a minimally inconsistent subset Y in which we can find two
distinct propositions p, q such that Y \{p, q} [ {¬p,¬q} is consistent. Since the sets
Y \{q} [ {¬q}, Y \{p, q} [ {¬p,¬q}, and Y \{p} [ {¬p} are each consistent (the first
and last because of Y ’s minimal inconsistency), there exist well-defined degree-of-belief
functions Cr0, Cr00, and Cr000 that assign credence 1 to all propositions in the first set,
to all propositions in the second, and to all propositions in the third set, respectively.
Now consider the function Cr = xCr0 + (y   x)Cr00 + (1   y)Cr000. Because Cr is a
linear average of three well-defined degree-of-belief functions, Cr is itself a well-defined
degree-of-belief function. Let B = f(Cr). Since x 2 C, we must have p 2 B. Since all
elements of Y \{p, q} are assigned credence 1 by Cr and 1 2 C (by Claim 1), we must
have Y \{p, q} ✓ B. Since Y in its entirety is inconsistent, Y \{p} entails ¬q, and hence
B entails ¬q. By implication-closure of B, ¬q must be in B. But Cr(¬q) = y, and hence
y is in C, as required.
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